Comment author: Kit 22 July 2018 06:13:14PM *  5 points [-]

Among the most significant confusions in investing is this: when you buy a stock for $10, you give up $10 now in exchange for some variable return in the future. Importantly, the seller gets back $10 and gives up the same variable return in the future. Both parties are happy with this trade (due to different preferences or beliefs about the world).

This symmetry applies to the social impact too. The buyer gets a stock producing social impact. The seller gives up a stock producing social impact. It is unclear whether this transaction has affected the total social impact in the world at all. My understanding is that the section A Rational Take on Investing does not take this into account.

The above paragraph is the typical second-order reasoning in this space, and is a more explicit version of a point kbog made.

  • First-order: I claim credit for whatever good/bad things I'm associated with, thus impact investing counts for a lot.

  • Second-order: taking counterfactuals into account, impact investing appears to have approximately zero impact.

  • The interesting stuff: controlling or launching important startups, and shareholder activism in general, seems like it might do something, and can sometimes be targeted at the most promising cause areas. Plant-based meat alternative companies are the companies that I'm aware of that seem likely to be worth EA investors' attention for this reason. Maybe holding tobacco company shares in order to be able to more easily lobby them might be attractive for EAs focused on global health. Note that these activist approaches are entirely distinct from what most of the impact investing industry is doing.

Comment author: WillPearson 23 July 2018 01:00:24AM 2 points [-]

There might be a further consideration, people might not start or fund impactful startups if there wasn't a good chance of getting investment. The initial investors (if not impact oriented), might still be counting on impact oriented people to buy the investment. So while each individual impact investor is not doing much in isolation, collectively they are creating a market for things that might not get funded otherwise. How you account for that I'm not sure.

Comment author: Milan_Griffes 15 July 2018 04:39:56PM 1 point [-]

My post is basically contesting the claim that any measurement is superior to no measurement in all domains.

Comment author: WillPearson 15 July 2018 06:55:10PM 1 point [-]

It might be worth looking at the domains where it might be less worthwhile (formal chaotic systems, or systems with many sign flipping crucial considerations). If you can show that trying to make cost-effectiveness based decisions in such environments is not worth it, that might strengthen your case.

Comment author: Gregory_Lewis 03 July 2018 10:47:53PM 4 points [-]

0: We agree potentially hazardous information should only be disclosed (or potentially discovered) when the benefits of disclosure (or discovery) outweigh the downsides. Heuristics can make principles concrete, and a rule of thumb I try to follow is to have a clear objective in mind for gathering or disclosing such information (and being wary of vague justifications like ‘improving background knowledge’ or ‘better epistemic commons’) and incur the least possible information hazard in achieving this.

A further heuristic which seems right to me is one should disclose information in the way that maximally disadvantages bad actors versus good ones. There are a wide spectrum of approaches that could be taken that lie between ‘try to forget about it’, and ‘broadcast publicly’, and I think one of the intermediate options is often best.

1: I disagree with many of the considerations which push towards more open disclosure and discussion.

1.1: I don’t think we should be confident there is little downside in disclosing dangers a sophisticated bad actor would likely rediscover themselves. Not all plausible bad actors are sophisticated: a typical criminal or terrorist is no mastermind, and so may not make (to us) relatively straightforward insights, but could still ‘pick them up’ from elsewhere.

1.2: Although a big fan of epistemic modesty (and generally a detractor of ‘EA exceptionalism’), EAs do have an impressive track record in coming up with novel and important ideas. So there is some chance of coming up with something novel and dangerous even without exceptional effort.

1.3: I emphatically disagree we are at ‘infohazard saturation’ where the situation re. Infohazards ‘can’t get any worse’. I also find it unfathomable ever being confident enough in this claim to base strategy upon its assumption (cf. eukaryote’s comment).

1.4: There are some benefits to getting out ‘in front’ of more reckless disclosure by someone else. Yet in cases where one wouldn’t want to disclose it oneself, delaying the downsides of wide disclosure as long as possible seems usually more important, and so rules against bringing this to an end by disclosing yourself save in (rare) cases one knows disclosure is imminent rather than merely possible.

2: I don’t think there’s a neat distinction between ‘technical dangerous information’ and ‘broader ideas about possible risks’, with the latter being generally safe to publicise and discuss.

2.1: It seems easy to imagine cases where the general idea comprises most of the danger. The conceptual step to a ‘key insight’ of how something could be dangerously misused ‘in principle’ might be much harder to make than subsequent steps from this insight to realising this danger ‘in practice’. In such cases the insight is the key bottleneck for bad actors traversing the risk pipeline, and so comprises a major information hazard.

2.2: For similar reasons, highlighting a neglected-by-public-discussion part of the risk landscape where one suspects information hazards lie has a considerable downside, as increased attention could prompt investigation which brings these currently dormant hazards to light.

3: Even if I take the downside risks as weightier than you, one still needs to weigh these against the benefits. I take the benefit of ‘general (or public) disclosure’ to have little marginal benefit above more limited disclosure targeted to key stakeholders. As the latter approach greatly reduces the downside risks, this is usually the better strategy by the lights of cost/benefit. At least trying targeted disclosure first seems a robustly better strategy than skipping straight to public discussion (cf.).

3.1: In bio (and I think elsewhere) the set of people who are relevant setting strategy and otherwise contributing to reducing a given risk is usually small and known (e.g. particular academics, parts of the government, civil society, and so on). A particular scientist unwittingly performing research with misuse potential might need to know the risks of their work (likewise some relevant policy and security stakeholders), but the added upside to illustrating these risks in the scientific literature is limited (and the added downsides much greater). The upside of discussing them in the popular/generalist literature (including EA literature not narrowly targeted at those working on biorisk) is limited still further.

3.2: Information also informs decisions around how to weigh causes relative to one another. Yet less-hazardous information (e.g. the basic motivation given here or here, and you could throw in social epistemic steers from the prevailing views of EA ‘cognoscenti’) is sufficient for most decisions and decision-makers. The cases where this nonetheless might be ‘worth it’ (e.g. you are a decision maker allocating a large pool of human or monetary capital between cause areas) are few and so targeted disclosure (similar to 3.1 above) looks better.

3.3: Beyond the direct cost of potentially giving bad actors good ideas, the benefits of more public discussion may not be very high. There are many ways public discussion could be counter-productive (e.g. alarmism, ill-advised remarks poisoning our relationship with scientific groups, etc.). I’d suggest the examples of cryonics, AI safety, GMOs and other lowlights of public communication of policy and science are relevant cautionary examples.

4: I also want to supply other more general considerations which point towards a very high degree caution:

4.1: In addition to the considerations around the unilateralist’s curse offered by Brian Wang (I have written a bit about this in the context of biotechnology here) there is also an asymmetry in the sense that it is much easier to disclose previously-secret information than make previously-disclosed information secret. The irreversibility of disclosure warrants further caution in cases of uncertainty like this.

4.2: I take the examples of analogous fields to also support great caution. As you note, there is a norm in computer security of ‘don’t publicise a vulnerability until there’s a fix in place’, and initially informing a responsible party to give them the opportunity to to do this pre-publication. Applied to bio, this suggests targeted disclosure to those best placed to mitigate the information hazard, rather than public discussion in the hopes of prompting a fix to be produced. (Not to mention a ‘fix’ in this area might prove much more challenging than pushing a software update.)

4.3: More distantly, adversarial work (e.g. red-teaming exercises) is usually done by professionals, with a concrete decision-relevant objective in mind, with exceptional care paid to operational security, and their results are seldom made publicly available. This is for exercises which generate information hazards for a particular group or organisation - similar or greater caution should apply to exercises that one anticipates could generate information hazardous for everyone.

4.4: Even more distantly, norms of intellectual openness are used more in some areas, and much less in others (compare the research performed in academia to security services). In areas like bio, the fact that a significant proportion of the risk arises from deliberate misuse by malicious actors means security services seem to provide the closer analogy, and ‘public/open discussion’ is seldom found desirable in these contexts.

5: In my work, I try to approach potentially hazardous areas as obliquely as possible, more along the lines of general considerations of the risk landscape or from the perspective of safety-enhancing technologies and countermeasures. I do basically no ‘red-teamy’ types of research (e.g. brainstorm the nastiest things I can think of, figure out the ‘best’ ways of defeating existing protections, etc.)

(Concretely, this would comprise asking questions like, “How are disease surveillance systems forecast to improve over the medium term, and are there any robustly beneficial characteristics for preventing high-consequence events that can be pushed for?” or “Are there relevant limits which give insight to whether surveillance will be a key plank of the ‘next-gen biosecurity’ portfolio?”, and not things like, “What are the most effective approaches to make pathogen X maximally damaging yet minimally detectable?”)

I expect a non-professional doing more red-teamy work would generate less upside (e.g. less well networked to people who may be in a position to mitigate vulnerabilities they discover, less likely to unwittingly duplicate work) and more downside (e.g. less experience with trying to manage info-hazards well) than I. Given I think this work is usually a bad idea for me to do, I think it’s definitely a bad idea for non-professionals to try.

I therefore hope people working independently on this topic approach ‘object level’ work here with similar aversion to more ‘red-teamy’ stuff, or instead focus on improving their capital by gaining credentials/experience/etc. (this has other benefits: a lot of the best levers in biorisk are working with/alongside existing stakeholders rather than striking out on one’s own, and it’s hard to get a role without (e.g.) graduate training in a relevant field). I hope to produce a list of self-contained projects to help direct laudable ‘EA energy’ to the best ends.

Comment author: WillPearson 04 July 2018 02:17:49PM 0 points [-]

Hi Gregory,

A couple of musings generated by your comment.

2: I don’t think there’s a neat distinction between ‘technical dangerous information’ and ‘broader ideas about possible risks’, with the latter being generally safe to publicise and discuss.

I have this idea of independent infrastructure, trying to make infrastructure (electricity/water/food/computing) that is on a smaller scale than current infrastructure. This is for a number of reasons, one of which includes mitigating risks, How should I build broad-scale support for my ideas without talking about the risks I am mitigating?

4.1: In addition to the considerations around the unilateralist’s curse offered by Brian Wang (I have written a bit about this in the context of biotechnology here) there is also an asymmetry in the sense that it is much easier to disclose previously-secret information than make previously-disclosed information secret. The irreversibility of disclosure warrants further caution in cases of uncertainty like this.

Although in some scenarios non-disclosure is irreversible as well, as conditions change. Consider if someone had the idea of hacking a computer and had managed to convince the designers of C to create a more secure list indexing and also everyone not to use other insecure languages. Now we would not be fighting the network effect of all the bad C code when trying to get people to code computers securely.

This irreversibility of non-disclosure seems to only occur if if something is not a huge threat right now, but may become more so as technology develops and gets more widely used and locked in. Not really relevant to the biotech arena. that I can think of immediately at least. But an interesting scenario nonetheless.

Comment author: brianwang712 27 June 2018 01:39:56PM 1 point [-]

Interesting idea. This may be worth trying to develop more fully?

Yeah. I'll have to think about it more.

I'm still coming at this from a lens of "actionable advice for people not in ea". It might be that the person doesn't know many other trusted individuals, what should be the advice then?

Yeah, for people outside EA I think structures could be set up such that reaching consensus (or at least a majority vote) becomes a standard policy or an established norm. E.g., if a journal is considering a manuscript with potential info hazards, then perhaps it should be standard policy for this manuscript to be referred to some sort of special group consisting of journal editors from a number of different journals to deliberate. I don't think people need to be taught the mathematical modeling behind the unilateralist's curse for these kinds of policies to be set up, as I think people have an intuitive notion of "it only takes one person/group with bad judgment to fuck up the world; decisions this important really need to be discussed in a larger group."

One important distinction is that people who are facing info hazards will be in very different situations when they are within EA vs. when they are out of EA. For people within EA, I think it is much more likely to be the case that a random individual has an idea that they'd like to share in a blog post or something, which may have info hazard-y content. In these situations the advice "talk to a few trusted individuals first" seems to be appropriate.

For people outside of EA, I think those who are in possession of info hazard-y content are much more likely to be embedded in some sort of larger institution (e.g., a research scientist or a journal editor looking to publish something), where perhaps the best leverage is setting up certain policies, rather than trying to teach everyone the unilateralist's curse.

As I understand it you shouldn't wait for consensus else you have the unilateralist's curse in reverse. Someone pessimistic about an intervention can block the deployment of an intervention needed to avoid disaster.

You're right, strict consensus is the wrong prescription. A vote is probably better. I wonder if there's mathematical modeling that you could do that would determine what fraction of votes is optimal, in order to minimize the harms of the standard unilateralist's curse and the curse in reverse? Is it a majority vote? A 2/3s vote? l suspect this will depend on what the "true sign" of releasing the potentially dangerous info is likely to be; the more likely it is to be negative, the higher bar you should be expected to clear before releasing.

Comment author: WillPearson 27 June 2018 07:50:21PM *  0 points [-]

For people outside of EA, I think those who are in possession of info hazard-y content are much more likely to be embedded in some sort of larger institution (e.g., a research scientist or a journal editor looking to publish something), where perhaps the best leverage is setting up certain policies, rather than trying to teach everyone the unilateralist's curse.

There is a growing movement of maker's and citizen scientists that are working on new technologies. It might be worth targeting them somewhat (although again probably without the math). I think the approaches for ea/non-ea seem sensible.

You're right, strict consensus is the wrong prescription. A vote is probably better. I wonder if there's mathematical modeling that you could do that would determine what fraction of votes is optimal, in order to minimize the harms of the standard unilateralist's curse and the curse in reverse? Is it a majority vote? A 2/3s vote? l suspect this will depend on what the "true sign" of releasing the potentially dangerous info is likely to be; the more likely it is to be negative, the higher bar you should be expected to clear before releasing.

I also like to weigh the downside of the lack of releasing the information as well. If you don't release information you are making everyone make marginally worse decisions (if you think someone will release it anyway later). For example in the nuclear fusion example, you think that everyone currently building new nuclear fission stations are wasting their time, that people training on how to manage coal plants should be training on something else etc, etc.

I also have another consideration which is possibly more controversial. I think we need some bias to action, because it seems like we can't go on as we are for too much longer (another 1000 years might be pushing it). The level of resources and coordination towards global problems fielded by the status quo seems insufficient. So it is a default bad outcome.

With this consideration, going back to the fusion pioneers, they might try and find people to tell so that they could increase the bus factor (the number of people that would have to die to lose the knowledge). They wouldn't want the knowledge to get lost (as it would be needed in the long term) and they would want to make sure that whoever they told understood the import and potential downsides of the technology.

Edit: Knowing the sign of an intervention is hard, even after the fact. Consider the invention and spread of the knowledge about nuclear chain reactions. Without it we would probably be burning a lot more fossil fuels, however with it we have the existential risk associated with it. If that risk never pays out, then it may have been a spur towards greater coordination and peace.

I'll try and formalise these thoughts at some point, but I am bit work impaired for a while.

Comment author: brianwang712 25 June 2018 03:38:49AM 0 points [-]

If there is a single person with the knowledge of how to create safe efficient nuclear fusion they cannot expect other people to release it on their behalf.

Ah right. I suppose the unilateralist's curse is only a problem insofar as there are a number of other actors also capable of releasing the information; if you are a single actor then the curse doesn't really apply. Although one wrinkle might be considering the unilateralist's curse with regards to different actors through time (i.e., erring on the side of caution with the expectation that other actors in the future will gain access to and might release the information), but coordination in this case might be more challenging.

What the researcher can do is try and build consensus/lobby for a collective decision making body on the internal climate heating (ICH) problem. Planning to release the information when they are satisfied that there is going to be a solution in time for fixing the problem when it occurs.

Thanks, this concrete example definitely helps.

I think I am also objecting to the expected payoff being thought of as a fixed quantity. You can either learn more about the world to alter your knowledge of the payoff or try and introduce things/insituttions into the world to alter the expected payoff. Building useful institutions may rely on releasing some knowledge, that is where things become more hairy.

This makes sense. "Release because the expected benefit is above the expected risk" or "not release because the vice versa is true" is a bit of a false dichotomy, and you're right that we should be more thinking about options that could maximize the benefit while minimizing the risk when faced with info hazards.

Also as the the unilaterlist's curse suggests discussing with other people such that they can undertake the information release, sometimes increases the expectation of a bad out come. How should consensus be reached in those situations?

This can certainly be a problem, and is a reason not to go too public when discussing it. Probably it's best to discuss privately with a number of other trusted individuals first, who also understand the unilateralist's curse, and ideally who don't have the means/authority of releasing the information themselves (e.g., if you have a written up blog post you're thinking of posting that might contain info hazards, then maybe you could discuss in vague terms with other individuals first, without sharing the entire post with them?).

Comment author: WillPearson 25 June 2018 07:12:53PM *  2 points [-]

Ah right. I suppose the unilateralist's curse is only a problem insofar as there are a number of other actors also capable of releasing the information; if you are a single actor then the curse doesn't really apply. Although one wrinkle might be considering the unilateralist's curse with regards to different actors through time (i.e., erring on the side of caution with the expectation that other actors in the future will gain access to and might release the information), but coordination in this case might be more challenging.

Interesting idea. This may be worth trying to develop more fully?

Probably it's best to discuss privately with a number of other trusted individuals first, who also understand the unilateralist's curse,

I'm still coming at this from a lens of "actionable advice for people not in ea". It might be that the person doesn't know many other trusted individuals, what should be the advice then? It would probably also be worth giving advice on how to have the conversation as well. The original article gives some advice on what happens if consensus can't be reached (voting/such like).

As I understand it you shouldn't wait for consensus else you have the unilateralist's curse in reverse. Someone pessimistic about an intervention can block the deployment of an intervention needed to avoid disaster (this seems very possible if you consider crucial considerations flipping signs, rather than just random noise in beliefs in desirability).

Would you suggest discussion and vote (assuming no other courses of action can be agreed upon)? Do you see the need to correct for status quo bias in any way?

This seems very important to get right. I'll think about this some more.

Comment author: brianwang712 24 June 2018 02:18:10AM 3 points [-]

The unilateralists curse only applies if you expect other people to have the same information as you right?

My understanding is that it applies regardless of whether or not you expect others to have the same information. All it requires is a number of actors making independent decisions, with randomly distributed error, with a unilaterally made decision having potentially negative consequences for all.

You can figure out if they have the same information as you to see if they are concerned about the same things you are. By looking at the mitigation's people are attempting. Altruists should be attempting mitigations in a unilateralist's curse position, because they should expect someone less cautious than them to unleash the information. Or they want to unleash the information themselves and are mitigating the downsides until they think it is safe.

I agree that having dangerous information released by those who are in a position to mitigate the risks is better than having a careless actor releasing that same information –– but I disagree that this is sufficient reason to preemptively release dangerous information. I think a world where everyone follows the logic of "other people are going to release this information anyway but less carefully, so I might as well release it first" is suboptimal compared to a world where everyone follows a norm of reaching consensus before releasing potentially dangerous information. And there are reasons to believe that this latter world isn't a pipe dream; after all, generally when we're thinking about info hazards, those who have access to the potentially dangerous information generally aren't malicious actors, but rather a finite number of, e.g., biology researchers (for biorisks) who could be receptive to establishing norms of consensus.

I'm also not sure how the strategy of "preemptively release, but mitigate" would work in practice. Does this mean release potentially dangerous information, but with the most dangerous parts redacted? Release with lots of safety caveats inserted? How does this preclude the further release of the unmitigated info?

I've not had the best luck reaching out to talk to people about my ideas. I expect that the majority of new ideas will come from people not heavily inside the group and thus less influenced by group think. So you might want to think of solutions that take that into consideration.

I'm not sure I'm fully understanding you here. If you're saying that the majority of potentially dangerous ideas will originate in those who don't know what the unilateralist's curse is, then I agree –– but I think this is just all the more reason to try to spread norms of consensus.

Comment author: WillPearson 24 June 2018 02:13:53PM 2 points [-]

My understanding is that it applies regardless of whether or not you expect others to have the same information. All it requires is a number of actors making independent decisions, with randomly distributed error, with a unilaterally made decision having potentially negative consequences for all.

Information determines the decisions that can be made. For example you can't spread the knowledge of how to create effective nuclear fusion without the information on how to make it.

If there is a single person with the knowledge of how to create safe efficient nuclear fusion they cannot expect other people to release it on their behalf. They may expect it to be net positive but they also expect some downsides and are unsure of whether it will be net good or not. To give a potential downside of nuclear fusion, let us say they are worried about creating excess heat over what the earth can dissipate due to widescale deployment in the world (even if it fixes global warming due to trapping solar energy, it might cause another heat related problem). I forget the technical term for this unfortunately.

The fusion expert(s) cannot expect other people to release this information for them, for as far as they know they are the only people making that exact decision.

I'm also not sure how the strategy of "preemptively release, but mitigate" would work in practice. Does this mean release potentially dangerous information, but with the most dangerous parts redacted? Release with lots of safety caveats inserted? How does this preclude the further release of the unmitigated info?

What the researcher can do is try and build consensus/lobby for a collective decision making body on the internal climate heating (ICH) problem. Planning to release the information when they are satisfied that there is going to be a solution in time for fixing the problem when it occurs.

If they find a greater than expected number of people lobbying for solutions to the ICH problem, then they can expect they are in a unilateralist's curse scenario. And they may want to hold off on releasing information even when they are satisfied with the way things are going (in case there is some other issue they have not thought of).

They can look to see what the other people are doing that have been helping with ICH and see if there other initiatives they are starting, that may or may not be to do with the advent of nuclear fusion.

I think I am also objecting to the expected payoff being thought of as a fixed quantity. You can either learn more about the world to alter your knowledge of the payoff or try and introduce things/insituttions into the world to alter the expected payoff. Building useful institutions may rely on releasing some knowledge, that is where things become more hairy.

I've not had the best luck reaching out to talk to people about my ideas. I expect that the majority of new ideas will come from people not heavily inside the group and thus less influenced by group think. So you might want to think of solutions that take that into consideration.

I'm not sure I'm fully understanding you here. If you're saying that the majority of potentially dangerous ideas will originate in those who don't know what the unilateralist's curse is, then I agree –– but I think this is just all the more reason to try to –– but I think this is just all the more reason to try to spread norms of consensus.

I was suggesting that more norm spreading should be done outwards, keeping it simple and avoiding too much jargon. Is there a presentation of the unilateralist's curse aimed at micro biologists for example?

Also as the the unilaterlist's curse suggests discussing with other people such that they can undertake the information release, sometimes increases the expectation of a bad out come. How should consensus be reached in those situations?

Increasing the number of agents capable of undertaking the initiative also exacerbates the problem: as N grows, the likelihood of someone proceeding incorrectly increases monotonically towards 1.7 The magnitude of this effect can be quite large even for relatively small number of agents. For example, with the same error assumptions as above, if the true value of the initiative V* = -1 (the initiative is undesirable), then the probability of erroneously undertaking the initiative grows rapidly with N, passing 50% for just 4 agents.

Comment author: brianwang712 23 June 2018 04:34:14PM 8 points [-]

The relevance of unilateralist's curse dynamics to info hazards is important and worth mentioning here. Even if you independently do a thorough analysis and decide that the info-benefits outweigh the info-hazards of publishing a particular piece of information, that shouldn't be considered sufficient to justify publication. At the very least, you should privately discuss with several others and see if you can reach a consensus.

Comment author: WillPearson 23 June 2018 09:12:57PM 0 points [-]

The unilateralists curse only applies if you expect other people to have the same information as you right?

You can figure out if they have the same information as you to see if they are concerned about the same things you are. By looking at the mitigation's people are attempting. Altruists should be attempting mitigations in a unilateralist's curse position, because they should expect someone less cautious than them to unleash the information. Or they want to unleash the information themselves and are mitigating the downsides until they think it is safe.

At the very least, you should privately discuss with several others and see if you can reach a consensus.

I've not had the best luck reaching out to talk to people about my ideas. I expect that the majority of new ideas will come from people not heavily inside the group and thus less influenced by group think. So you might want to think of solutions that take that into consideration.

Comment author: WillPearson 23 May 2018 09:46:58PM 2 points [-]

Thanks for writing this up! I've forwarded it to a friend who was interested in the happiness app space a while back.

I would add to the advice, from my experience, pick something not too far out of people's comfort zones for a startup or research idea. There seems to be a horizon beyond which you don't get feedback or help at all.

Comment author: WillPearson 05 April 2018 10:39:08AM 0 points [-]

I think it possible that blockchain can help us solve some co-ordination problems. However it also introduces new ones (e.g. which fork of a chain/version of the protocol you should go with).

So I am torn. It would be good to see one successful use/solid proposal of the technology for solving our real world coordination problems using ethereum.

Something I am keeping an eye on is the economic space agency

Comment author: WillPearson 15 February 2018 11:12:16PM 1 point [-]

I would add something likes "Sensitivity" to the list of attributes needed to navigate the world.

This is different from Predictive Power. You can imagine two ships, with the exact same compute power and Predictive Power. One with cameras on the outside and long range sensors, one blind without. You'd expect the first to do a lot better moving about the world

In Effective Altruism's case I suspect this would be things like the basic empirical research about the state of the world and the things important to their goals.

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