Comment author: turchin 27 September 2018 11:30:33PM *  0 points [-]

Reading your comment I come to the following patch of my argument: benevolent AI starts not from S(t), but immediately from many copies of those S(t+1) which have much less intense sufferings, but still have enough similarity with S(t) to be regarded as its next moment of experience. Not S(t) will be diluted, but the next moments of the S(t). This solves the need to create many S(t)-moments which seems morally wrong and computationally intensive.

My plan is that FAI can't decrease the number of suffering moments, but the plan is to create an immediate way out of each such moment. While total utilitarian will not feel the difference, it is just a theory which was not designed to account for the length of suffering, but for any particular observer, this will be a salvation.

Comment author: Lukas_Finnveden 28 September 2018 09:23:08AM 1 point [-]

I remain unconvinced, probably because I mostly care about observer-moments, and don't really care what happens to individuals independently of this. You could plausibly construct some ethical theory that cares about identity in particular way such that this works, but I can't quite see how it would look, yet. You might want to make those ethical intuitions as concrete as you can, and put them under 'Assumptions'.

Comment author: Lukas_Finnveden 27 September 2018 03:20:47PM *  5 points [-]

However, this trick will increase the total suffering in the multiverse, from the purely utilitarian perspective, by 1000 times, as the number of suffering observer-moments will increase. But here we could add one more moral assumption: “Very short pain should be discounted”, based on the intuition that 0.1 seconds of intense pain is bearable (assuming it does not cause brain damage)—simply because it will pass very quickly.

I'd say pain experienced during 0.1 seconds is about 10 times less bad than pain experienced during 1 second. I don't see why we should discount it any further than that. Our particular human psychology might be better at dealing with injury if we expect it to end soon, but we can't change what the observer-moment S(t) expects to happen without changing the state of it's mind. If we change the state of it's mind, it's not a copy of S(t) anymore, and the argument fails.

In general, I can't see how this plan would work. As you say, you can't decrease the absolute number of suffering oberver-moments, so it won't do any good from the perspective of total utilitarianism. The closest thing I can imagine is to "dilute" pain by creating similar but somewhat happier copies, if you believe in some sort of average utilitarianism that cares about identity. That seems like a strange moral theory, though.

Comment author: laurenwhetstone 21 September 2018 03:43:46PM 0 points [-]

We've fixed the data link so it should be working now. Apologies for the inconvenience!

Comment author: Lukas_Finnveden 26 September 2018 09:37:39AM 1 point [-]

Neither the link in the text nor Chi's links work for me. They both give 404. I can't find the data when looking directly at Peter's github either https://github.com/peterhurford/ea-data/tree/master/data/2018