This is similar to the US poverty line. In the book Strangers Drowning, which featured some EAs, there was a guy trying to live on the global average income in ~1980. That was really extreme because inflation adjusted global per capita income has risen a lot since then.

Volunteering in England

Volunteering in the US

Charitable giving in the UK

You could look at the forthcoming 2017 EA Survey data, or try looking at the past 2015 EA Survey and 2014 EA Survey.

I have found it helpful in talking about donating large percentages of salary to be able to point out how many people do similar amounts of sacrifice. One comparison that has been made was with being vegetarian. But this is hard to compare and still only a few percent of people. More common is people taking a 10% pay cut for positive impact of their job, or donating 10% of their free time (which I am saying is roughly 40 hours per week if one has a full-time job (comments here)). I tried to get some rough estimates of the rates of these behaviors, but has anyone else done it more rigorously or would like to do it?

I think ITN is good for scoping problems, but many think it shouldn't be used for interventions. So for interventions, I think quantitative models like this one are valuable.

Okay. So the source I found was probably wrong. I can't see how this has any significance on the argument, so it would have been more useful to say "this isn't important for the argument, but just so you know ... "

Thanks - very interesting. Could an EA pay for drug medical studies in Portugal? It seems like there are millions of people working on marijuana legalization, and many critics of the war on drugs. I know you are looking more holistically, but overall it doesn't seem that neglected.

For those who think something else is more important, I would be very grateful if you could produce some (very rough) estimates of how many times more cost effective money to their preferred cause is than DPR.

Some people would say ~10^40 times (computer consciousnesses and spreading intergalactically). Of course there are many reasons why this vision may not pan out, but it does seem like we should have a non-negligible probability that we are alone in the galaxy (or even the visible universe) and that we can and have the will to colonize the stars if we don't destroy ourselves. These qualifiers might only take a few orders of magnitude off. Then even if you do not believe in the tractability of AI, there are many other concrete interventions that could reduce existential risk, like asteroid defense and alternate foods. So basically I do not believe the prior of cost effectiveness of global poverty interventions should be strong, so I don't think we should adjust these expected value calculations downward nearly as much as some proposed models have done.

Also, if one does not value the far future, there are other claims of cost effectiveness better than global poverty.

According to 2005 data, production was valued at $13 billion, the wholesale industry priced at $94 billion and retail estimated to be worth $332 billion. The wholesale valuation for the drugs market is higher than the global equivalent for cereals, wine, beer, coffee, and tobacco combined.

I couldn't see the full report from your link, but global grain (cereal) production is around 2.2 billion tons per year. Wholesale price fluctuates, but it is around $1/kg, so ~$2 trillion per year. This is more than an order of magnitude bigger than your illicit drug wholesale value.

Great idea! Do you want a 16 page CV or a 2 page resume? If CV, how do you want one to anonymize publications?

This is a good survey. As you said, you focused on US and UK. But was it your intent to try to extrapolate that as a global value so we can show how cost-effective global poverty interventions are? Then if you do the same surveys about how much more poor workers would demand to be paid because of a risky occupation, the value of statistical life would be much smaller. So I ended up doing a broad distribution for the global value here. Note that I sidestepped the discounting issue by saying that the value of statistical life is growing, so we should not have to discount the current values.