RobBensinger comments on In defence of epistemic modesty - Effective Altruism Forum

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Comment author: RobBensinger 04 November 2017 04:53:28PM *  1 point [-]

The "Cheating Death in Damascus" and "Functional Decision Theory" papers came out in March and October, so I recommend sharing those, possibly along with the "Decisions Are For Making Bad Outcomes Inconsistent" conversation notes. I think these are much better introductions than e.g. Eliezer's old "Timeless Decision Theory" paper.

Quineans and logical positivists have some vague attitudes in common with people like Drescher, but the analogy seems loose to me. If you want to ask why other philosophers didn't grab all the low-hanging fruit in areas like decision theory or persuade all their peers in areas like philosophy of mind (which is an interesting set of questions from where I'm standing, and one I'd like to see examined more too), I think a more relevant group to look at will be technically minded philosophers who think in terms of Bayesian epistemology (and information-theoretic models of evidence, etc.) and software analogies. In particular, analogies that are more detailed than just "the mind is like software", though computationalism is an important start. A more specific question might be: "Why didn't E.T. Jaynes' work sweep the philosophical community?"